This book is about the political governance of cultural diversity. It analyses how public policy-making has dealt with the claims for cultural recognition that have increasingly been expressed by ethno-national movements, language groups, religious minorities, indigenous peoples and migrant communities in the past decades. Its major aim is to understand, explain and assess public policy responses to ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. Adopting the perspective of comparative and interdisciplinary social sciences, it addresses the conditions, forms and consequences of democratic and human-rights-based governance of multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-faith societies.

That cultural diversity has become a political challenge throughout the world stems from a complex set of factors. One of the major factors of cultural diversification in various societies is globalization. The intensified flow of capital, post-Fordist modes of production and the global spread of Western consumer culture have prompted a variety of social movements that emphasize their own ethnic, linguistic or religious distinctiveness. The emergence of transnational migrant networks, facilitated by growing inequalities in the capitalist world-system as well as by new technologies of transport and electronic communication, is another prominent aspect of such cultural diversification. What all these new social movements have in common, whether based on ethnicity, language or religion, is that they demand full and equal inclusion in society, while claiming the recognition of their particularistic identities in the public sphere. They criticize the assumption of congruence between political unity and cultural homogeneity which was characteristic of the classic model of the nation-state, and thereby contribute to its far-reaching institutional transformation.

In this book, we address the political governance of cultural diversity by focusing on this transformation of the nation-state and of political modernity in general. The contributions to this volume deal with specific aspects of governing ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity from different disciplinary perspectives. In our introduction, we situate them within a larger conceptual framework. Thus, in the first section, we argue that a major problem implicit in contemporary debates about cultural diversity is the on-
going transformation of the classical nation-state. In a second section, we highlight that a crucial aspect of this transformation is the emergence and development of international human rights regimes, which alter the external legitimacy structures of nation-states by providing new social arenas and new cultural repertoires of contention and claims-making. And thirdly, we analyse the particular challenges posed to the classical model of the nation-state by politics of ethnic or national, linguistic and religious recognition, respectively.

NATION-STATES AND THE PROBLEM OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Conceptualizing the political governance of cultural diversity poses a challenge to the social sciences, to the extent that these were for a long time impregnated by what some authors have called a “methodological nationalism” (Glick-Schiller and Wimmer 2003; see also Wallerstein et al. 1996; Wimmer 2002). By taking territorially bounded, socially closed and culturally integrated societies as their basic units of analysis, the social sciences have tended to ignore, to naturalize or simply to take for granted the nation-state as an institutional form of political modernity. However, seen in long-term historical perspective, this institutional form is highly contingent and problematic and therefore needs closer analysis.

The core feature of the modern nation-state is a structural coupling of political organization and collective identity which has deeply shaped our political vocabulary including such notions as constitutionalism, democracy and human rights. Thus, since the French Revolution popular sovereignty was conceived in terms of state independence and national self-determination, with the consequence that human rights were identified with citizen rights and attached to national identity. Perhaps the best illustration of this structural coupling of statehood and national identity is the institution of citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Hanagan/Tilly 1999). Understood as a set of institutionalized relations between the state and the individual, citizenship can be considered as being composed of two major elements: firstly, the rules of formal membership and individual rights through which individuals are incorporated organizationally into the state, and secondly, the forms of national identification through which individuals are incorporated symbolically. Of course, the close correspondence of political and cultural collectivity, assumed in the classical model of the nation-state, was rarely given in historical reality, as most states used to contain culturally heterogeneous populations. Yet, under the impact of that model, state-formation and nation-building were often accompanied by policies of cultural homogenization. Claims for recognition put forward by ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities were thus routinely seen as a threat to state stability and to national cohesion.

Today, conflicts about cultural diversity seem to contest the homogenizing assumptions of the classical nation-state model. Policies of assimilation or of differential exclusion are increasingly considered as illegitimate, both at domestic and international levels, while pluralistic
policy responses, as exemplified by anti-discrimination legislation, affirmative action programmes or special minority protection, have gained momentum. Policies of “multiculturalism”, as adopted by the governments of Australia, Canada, Sweden and some other countries in response to the poly-ethnic situation induced by international migration, are particularly noteworthy in this respect, as they aim simultaneously to achieve individual inclusion and respect for cultural differences (Castles 1995; Inglis 1996; Alexander 2001). That “consociational” democracies, such as in Belgium, the Netherlands or Switzerland (Lijphart 1977; Gagnon and Tully 2001), have recently become models for other multi-national democracies, is another indicator for changing assumptions about the nation-state. What we seem to witness is thus a certain decoupling of statehood and national identity. The question emerging from these developments is whether, and if so how, notions of constitutionalism, democracy and human rights may and need to be reformulated in such “post-national constellations” (Habermas 1998).

In political theory, the question of political governance in culturally diverse societies has, over the past decade, been extensively discussed in controversies surrounding the “politics of cultural recognition” (Gutmann 1994; Tully 1995) and “multicultural citizenship” (Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Mouffe 1992). Two major dilemmas are addressed in these debates. First, how can the recognition of cultural differences be reconciled with the social reproduction of trust and solidarity that is necessary for the maintenance of a democratic polity? Here, the question is which constitutional arrangements guarantee the functioning of a common sphere, while leaving room for the maintenance of diverse cultural practices and identities. The second dilemma is how to reconcile the recognition of minorities as groups with the concept of human rights, which focuses on the rights of the individual person. Put differently, how can constitutional arrangements mediate between different groups’ collective rights of self-rule and the individual’s rights to inclusion in the larger polity?

While a variety of policy experiences is reflected in the literature addressing these questions, the debates are often far more concerned with philosophical rather than empirical problems. Thus, a core issue of debate is the normative justification of policies in the light of classical traditions of political theory, such as liberalism, republicanism and social democracy. To be sure, such normative reflections on the triangle of democracy, human rights and cultural diversity have considerably helped to reconstruct the arguments put forward by political actors to legitimate (or contest) pluralistic policies. Yet, as Michel Wieviorka (2001) has recently argued, these philosophical approaches have sometimes tended to ignore the empirical dynamics of the cultural construction, social formation and political mobilization of collective identities. Lacking conceptual tools to analyse the institutional prerequisites, favourable factors, and social consequences of public policy-making, they cannot explain varying policy output and varying policy outcomes in different social situations. Here precisely lies, in our view, the genuine contribution of social science research to the debate on the political governance of culturally diverse societies. Which factors, globalization
among them, give rise to politics of cultural recognition in the first place? Which public policies do governments adopt in reaction to cultural diversity, and how are these determined by existing institutional arrangements? And, finally, what is the concrete impact of pluralistic policies on the inclusion/exclusion of minorities in different social contexts? In the following, we elaborate these questions in some greater detail.

TRANSFORMING THE NATION-STATE – THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

One of the major factors explaining the rise of politics of cultural recognition as well as more pluralistic policy responses to cultural diversity is the multifaceted process of globalization. As a particularly important dimension of this process, we would like to highlight the institutionalization of human rights in cultural and social frameworks at a transnational or global level (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996). In fact, the evolution of international human rights regimes has contributed to far-reaching changes in the legitimacy structure of political modernity since the post-war period. Two transformations which directly affect the institution of national citizenship may be distinguished in this respect. Firstly, the transnational diffusion of ideas of human rights and their institutionalization in international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, has established a status of “universal personhood” to which rights are, at least in principle, attached independently from formal state membership or nationality. And secondly, within the transnational human rights discourse there has been a proliferation of new rights which clearly go beyond the classical modern political tradition. Thus, rights of equality and non-discrimination have been specified in articles on individual rights to cultural identity and minority rights which oblige state governments to adopt a proactive approach to the promotion of the identity of ethnic or national, linguistic and religious minorities on their territory.

Within the United Nations (UN), where strong references to questions of minority protection had initially been avoided, the principles of non-discrimination and equality have been supplemented by the idea that states should not only protect, but also promote the identities of minorities (see Phillips and Rosas 1995; Symonides 1998). This trend is documented in the changing interpretation of Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by the United Nations in 1966. The article states:

In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. (Article 27, ICCPR)

Whereas this article used to be interpreted in a rather restricted way (see Capotorti 1979), its content and coverage have recently been expanded so as to oblige the state to create favourable conditions for the maintenance of
group identities and to include “new minorities”. Thus, the Human Rights Committee, in its general comment on Article 27 ICCPR, has stated:

Although the rights protected under article 27 are individual rights, they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture, language or religion. Accordingly, positive measures by States may also be necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to practice their religion, in community with the other members of the group. (UN doc CCPR General Comment 23: The rights of minorities [8 April 1994], para. 6.2., emphasis added).

In its current understanding, Article 27 ICCPR thus constitutes the basis for broad conceptions of a “pluralism in togetherness” according to which minority identities are to be promoted by the state, while ensuring social integration in a common public sphere (see Eide 1994).

The same trend is manifested, for example, by the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 47/135 in 1992 which calls upon states to “protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and [...] encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity” (Article 1(1); see also Thornberry 199). The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 31st session in 2001 points in the same direction. At the level of regional human rights regimes, similar developments can be observed, especially after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, under the auspices of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (199) are the most notable documents in that respect.

All these developments in transnational human rights law contribute to a de-legitimization of the classical model of the nation-state with its assumptions of cultural homogeneity of its citizens. They strengthen the position of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities and thus necessitate new public policies of governing diversity.

ETHNIC, LINGUISTIC AND RELIGIOUS POLITICS OF RECOGNITION

The social science literature dealing with policy reactions to cultural diversity seems to be highly fragmented along different disciplinary as well as thematic lines. Most notably, there is on the one side, a burgeoning literature that deals with policies of immigration and integration in industrial societies (Aleinkoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Bauböck et al. 1996; Bauböck and Rundell 1998; Castles and Davidson 2000; Joppke 1998) in which policy shifts from assimilation to “multiculturalism” – and back to assimilation (Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004; Joppke and Morawska 2003) – are well documented and analysed. On the other side, social scientists have also been concerned with
institutional contours of so-called “plural societies”, characterized by long-standing ethnic and national cleavage structures (Stavenhagen 1996; Young 1998; Young 1999). While it is true that international migration has resulted in other types of cultural conflict than processes of nation-building in plural societies, both “old” and “new” types of identity politics equally challenge classical models of the nation-state. However, these commonalities are not further scrutinized due to this fragmentation of research agendas (for exceptions see for example Díez-Medrano 1995, Rex and Singh 2004).

In this book, we therefore adopt a slightly different approach. We focus on three dimensions of cultural diversity that challenge distinctive aspects of the classical nation-state model: ethnicity, language and religion. All these dimensions were, in multifaceted ways, closely related to processes of state-formation and nation-building. As a consequence, democratic states are in at least one of these dimensions less culturally neutral than is often assumed in political theory. To understand the complexities of governing cultural diversity, it is therefore imperative to capture the distinctive logics of ethnic, linguistic and religious politics of recognition.

Territorially Based Ethnic or National Movements

The most acute challenge to the coupling of political organization and collective identity within the classical nation-state is posed by territorially based ethnic or nationalist movements. Their claims for recognition not only call for equal respect in the common public sphere, but may turn into fully fledged strategies for secession. Cross-national comparative studies in the social sciences have shown that accelerated processes of globalization and the end of the Cold War have indeed brought about a resurgence and intensification of ethnic or nationalist movements (for example Gurr 1993). Furthermore, the growing robustness of the international human rights regime, in which the individual and collective rights of minorities are increasingly recognized, has strengthened the legitimacy of ethnic minorities’ claims for self-determination (Tsutsui 2004).

Yet, while the initial formation and mobilization of ethnic or national movements has been widely explored, the impact of various government policies and constitutional arrangements on the support for secession and on the degree of violence involved in ethno-national conflicts is studied less. In fact, state governments have responded to claims for self-determination in a variety of ways, ranging from utmost repression to pluralistic policies such as communal representation, federalism or cultural autonomy (Ghai 2002). How the outcome of such policies can be evaluated is, however, far from clear.

In his contribution to this volume, Juan Díez-Medrano analyses the impact of government policies, by starting from available theoretical explanations of support for secessionist movements. Reviewing primordialism, social constructivism and rational choice theory, he highlights several structural and processual factors that contribute to popular support for secessionism and violence. From there, he develops a set of hypotheses on the extent to
which these factors may be manipulated through state policy. Thus, while patterns of geographical and economic segregation may be difficult to reverse, state policy may shape a non-antagonistic public discourse about interethnic relations, respond favourably to non-violent demands of ethnic movements and adopt well-targeted public order policies. Comparative evidence suggests that non-indiscriminate public order policies, which only target radicals and not the ethnic group as a whole, combined with responsive policies might contribute to declining levels of violence and decreasing support for secessionism.

Thus, Enric Martínez-Herrera argues that the combination of efficacious but flexible public order policies, together with very substantial doses of responsiveness, contributes to the mitigation of Basque nationalist terrorism and extremism in Spain. His time-series multivariate analyses, aimed at evaluating policy outcomes in terms of support for violence and for secessionism, also show that certain specific policy choices have been either inefficacious or counterproductive, whereas terrorist violence itself tends, paradoxically, to decrease the attitudinal social bases of insurgent nationalist extremism.

Similar conclusions may be drawn from Stefan Wolff’s case study on the Northern Irish conflict in the United Kingdom. He analyses the different policies employed by the British government to manage the conflict in Northern Ireland between the late 1960s and the conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Drawing attention to the consequences of conflicting perceptions for the conflict management strategies, he evaluates success and failure of individual British strategies to manage the conflict in terms of policy objectives and, in particular, by the responses of paramilitary organizations and of the electorate. Here, as in the Basque case, the attempted or achieved solutions have involved political and institutional recognition of the ethnonational rights of the parties involved.

Yet it would be premature to argue that only pluralistic policies could settle conflicts with ethnonational movements, as is clearly shown by Matthew Kocher’s analysis of the Kurdish case. Prior to the 1990s, most regional experts insisted that only a negotiated settlement could provide a solution to “the Kurdish problem” in Turkey. It was widely assumed that the uncompromising stance of the government would result in a radicalization of the Kurdish population, which would further fuel violence. However, this has not happened. In the late 1990s, the Turkish state defeated the insurgent organization PKK militarily, without making any important concessions to Kurdish nationalism. That further polarization of Kurdish politics has still not ensued is due to intra-ethnic and cross-cutting political cleavage structures undermining support for nationalist extremism.

The results of these three in-depth case studies, if interpreted within the analytical framework of structural and process factors for support of ethnic or national violence and secessionism as laid out by Juan Díez-Medrano, suggest that non-indiscriminate public-order policies as well as responsive policies have a clear effect on reducing levels of violence, to the extent that they also secure the individual and collective rights of ethnic minorities in plural societies.
Linguistic Diversity and Language Policy

While not necessarily leading to secessionist movements, linguistic diversity also poses a considerable challenge to democratic polities. As language is the most fundamental tool of communication, states cannot be linguistically neutral. In fact, state-building was often accompanied by strong policies of linguistic homogenization, as evinced most notably in France (Weber 1979). In addition to its instrumental, communicative function, language also carries symbolic functions and has thereby contributed to the construction of collective identities. Corpus planning, that is, the standardization of scripts, semantics and grammar, and the canonization of literatures were among the most prominent policy tools in processes of nation-building worldwide (Anderson 1983; Wright 2004). Classical democratic theory in its assumption of a common sphere of public discourse was implicitly built on these linguistic characteristics of the nation-state.

However, the classical model of the nation-state is challenged by de facto linguistic diversity resulting from international migration and social networks based on new electronic media of communication, and by de jure linguistic pluralism imposed on nation-states by international human rights regimes. As a consequence, new policies need to be designed to ensure the respect for language rights while at the same time strengthening the reproduction of a common sphere of public discourse (see Koenig 1999; Kymlicka and Patten 2003). In that context it is important to notice that, as Fernand de Varennes forcefully argues, language rights are generally conceived as specifications of basic human rights such as freedom of expression and non-discrimination, both under the global and various regional human rights regimes. His review of various international legal documents suggests that they are only inadequately captured by notions of (unenforceable) collective or minority rights. Rather, claims to the private and public use of minority languages are justified as individual human rights. But even as minorities are not in themselves bearers of collective rights, the transnational legal discourse of human rights does de-legitimize strong policies of language homogenization and clearly obliges states to respect and promote linguistic diversity (see also de Varennes 1996).

There are many organizational mechanisms by which transnational legal discourse affects national policy-making. International organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, certainly play a crucial role in this respect. Sally Holt and John Packer provide detailed information on one of the most prominent actors in the field of linguistic rights, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As an organization which is concerned primarily with peace and security, the OSCE approach to linguistic diversity and notably to the linguistic rights of national minorities has been one of conflict-prevention. Post-Soviet state-building and the resurgence of nationalist movements and inter-ethnic conflict in that region have achieved particular attention in this respect. Evidently, institutions such as the OSCE have mounted normative pressure on states to
implement international legal standards aimed at protecting and promoting the linguistic rights of persons belonging to national minorities.

However, to what extent this changing transnational legitimacy structure of nation-states affects domestic policy output is open to scrutiny. Many case studies show that, in spite of such normative pressure, public policies continue to be influenced by historical trajectories of state-formation and nation-building along with other more contextual factors. Thus, as Boriss Cilevičs shows in his review of language legislation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after the restoration of their independence, there are a number of inconsistencies with the provision of the international legal instruments on the linguistic rights of national minorities. The regulations determining the status of the state language and the languages of national minorities, and governing the use of languages in elected bodies, before public authorities, in media, in education, and in employment, bear the imprint of post-communist nation-building aimed at reversing the hitherto dominant status of the Russian language.

The Baltic case also shows that there may, in practical terms, be tensions between human rights standards and the process of democratization. In that respect, post-apartheid South Africa provides another interesting example. The country contains numerous linguistic population groups, all of which can be considered linguistic minorities, with the possible exception of the English-speaking group. Between 1910 and 1994 South Africa had two official languages, English and Dutch (later Afrikaans). Simultaneously, the indigenous and Indian languages were given a grossly inferior status. As Kristin Henrard demonstrates, during the negotiations for a constitution in post-apartheid South Africa, the status of the languages spoken in South Africa proved to be particularly sensitive. Although she finds the constitutional framework concerning the accommodation of South Africa’s linguistic diversity rather promising, practice reveals a de facto denial of several constitutional principles concerning the status of languages and multi-lingualism, which goes hand in hand with the emergence of English as lingua franca.

If public policies continue to be affected by historical trajectories, their actual outcomes are supposedly even more determined by contextual social dynamics. To what extent language policies, including both status and corpus planning, alter the power-differentials between dominant and minority languages has been extensively discussed in socio-linguistic research. Of particular interest in this context are the intended and unintended consequences of interventions in favour of endangered languages. Suzanne Romaine argues that evaluating the potential and actual impact of language policies is complicated by lack of straightforward causal connections between types of policy and language maintenance and shift. Language policy, so her argument goes, is not an autonomous factor, and what appears to be ostensibly the same policy may lead to different outcomes depending on the situation in which it operates. Conventions and treaties adopted by international organizations and agencies recommending the use of minority languages in education usually lack power to be reinforced. Furthermore, policies have negligible impact on home use, which is
essential for continued natural transmission of endangered languages. Although survival thus cannot depend on legislation as its main support, legal provisions may allow speakers of endangered languages to claim some public space for their languages and cultures.

Secularism and Religious Diversity

Religious diversity is perhaps the oldest dimension of social and political cleavages in many parts of the world (Rokkan 1970; Martin 1978). In fact, confessional identities provided the backbone for processes of state-formation and nation-building in early modern Europe. With confessional fragmentation, various institutional modes of governing religion developed, ranging from secularist exclusion of religion from the public sphere to corporative forms of religious inclusion. Yet, these constitutional arrangements have recently been challenged by a resurgence of religion and new patterns of religious pluralization triggered by globalization, international migration and the emergence of transnational religious networks.

However, political and academic debates on the so-called “resurgence of religion” often suffer from simplistic assumptions about modernity and the process of globalization. Some argue that globalization strengthens the differences between Western modernity and other, non-Western civilizations; in this perspective, most prominently formulated by Samuel Huntington (1996), religious diversity is interpreted, both on a global and a national level, as mirroring inter-civilizational conflict. Others, such as Francis Fukuyama (1992), promote an opposing view arguing that globalization processes imply a homogenization of civilizations in accordance with Western modernity; hence, compared to the impact of a globally diffused consumer culture, religious diversity would be judged as a marginal phenomenon without serious political implications. What both perspectives share is the assumption that (Western) modernity is characterized by “secularization”, that is, by a decline of religion, the functional differentiation of politics and religion, and the privatization of religious beliefs. However, the rising politics of religious recognition in Western and non-Western countries attests to the public dimension of religion in modernity (Bader 2003; Casanova 1994; Koenig 2005).

In his contribution to this volume, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, adopting a broad historical perspective on the rise and transformation of modernity, takes an explicit stance against both Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s theses. He situates fundamentalist and communal religious movements within the larger context of a structural transformation of the modern nation-state and increased global interconnectedness which allows for multiple interpretations of major principles of political modernity. These movements simultaneously draw on the religious dimension of the so-called “Axial civilizations” and on the totalitarian or Jacobin dimensions of modernity. In his view, new potential for conflict therefore arises from the multiplication of different, yet presumably universalistic, interpretations of modernity rather than from the confrontation of different particularistic cultures.
Thus, whereas religious pluralism may, on the one hand, lead to peaceful co-existence and even to ideological convergence among different religions, it may, on the other hand, also lead to social dissolution, as it intensifies the awareness of fundamental differences between religious world-views, thus potentially provoking social conflicts along religious lines. Hence, the major question is how political governance of religious diversity may respect the individual’s right to religious liberty, while at the same time recognizing religious identities in the public sphere.

Ole Riis takes up this question in his contribution by discussing conceptual, theoretical and empirical problems of analysing public policy responses to religious diversity. Reviewing various theoretical approaches in sociology of religion, he distinguishes different ideal-typical “modes of religious pluralism”, understood as an institutional framework of governing religious diversity. These modes of religious pluralism, which result from specific historical trajectories of state-formation and nation-building, may stress religious toleration, corporative rights of religious denominations or individual religious freedom. In so far as either of these aspects may be given priority, public policies responding to contemporary religious pluralization vary. The outcome of such policies, in turn, depends on a number of sociological aspects, including the distribution of political, economic and cultural resources.

The political challenge posed by religious pluralization is illustrated in James Beckford’s case-study on the governance of religious diversity in prisons in England and Wales. As is well known, the variety of faith traditions represented in the country has grown due to international migration, as have the numbers of, for example, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Muslims and Sikhs. More importantly, these faith communities have established themselves to the point where they can confidently demand “equal respect” and “equality of opportunity” to practise their religion in private and public. As a consequence, the importance of policies governing religious and ethno-religious diversity in England and Wales has increased in recent decades. Whereas the Anglican Church used to function as broker between the State and religious communities, there has recently been a shift to various forms of multi-faith chaplaincy. Contrary to those who fear that such even-handed pluralistic policies may increase segmentation along lines of ethno-religious difference, Beckford argues that they contribute to both the equal respect of religious human rights and social integration.

By comparison, politics of religious recognition have taken rather different forms in post-communist countries. Here, religion has regained political and public importance in several respects. Firstly, the reconstruction of national identities which has accompanied both the break-down of communist regimes and the process of democratization has often drawn on religious traditions which had been involved in nation-building and state-formation prior to the communist era. Secondly, a remarkable religious pluralization has led to public debates over the respect for the individual’s rights to religious freedom and, hence, the recognition of religious diversity (Anderson 2003). These somewhat contradictory trends are well exemplified by the governance of religious diversity in the Russian Federation, as analysed
by Kathy Rousselet in her contribution to this volume. On the one hand, the Russian Orthodox Church has actively participated in the reconstruction of Russian national identity while, on the other hand, de facto religious diversity has led to concerns, both domestic and international, about the full legal recognition of diverse religious identities, notably in those republics with a strong Islamic presence. Rousselet’s analysis suggests that the governance of religious diversity may be considered as an indicator of the degree of democratisation.

From different angles, then, the contributions show that contrary to conventional theories of secularization there is an enduring place for religion within the public spheres of modern democratic polities. They suggest that secularism may not always be the most suitable policy to religious diversity, but that context-sensitive solutions have to be found which respond to claims of religious recognition, while at the same time furthering democratic participation in a common public sphere.

CONCLUSION

The governance of cultural diversity is a key issue in contemporary politics, both domestically and internationally. Accommodating increased cultural diversity by balancing the recognition of differences with the promotion of equal participation in the common public sphere is a task that will, for the foreseeable future, be with us to stay.

The contributions to this volume show that this task requires finding suitable public policy responses to ethnic, linguistic and religious claims for recognition that go beyond the classical institutional contours of the modern nation-state. They also show that while human rights do provide some normative yardsticks for policy-making in this respect, no single and simple solutions exist. The dynamics of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity follow different logics, respectively, and they moreover vary as a function of different historical trajectories of state-formation and nation-building. Accommodating cultural diversity therefore requires finding highly context-sensitive pluralistic policy designs.

It is in this respect – by providing knowledge about the socio-historical contexts of, and preconditions for, successful pluralistic policies – that interdisciplinary and comparative social science research can make an important contribution to the debate about the political governance of cultural diversity in post-national constellations.

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